Dönitz in a sentence

Dönitz commenced plans for his first hunting forays into U.S. coastal waters.

No one under Admiral Dönitz’s command got to choose his sweetheart’s name as an Enigma message indicator.

Something needed to be done about Admiral Dönitz’s deadly underwater predators before they completely choked off the supplies of food, munitions, and fuel needed to keep Britain in the war.

Admiral Karl Dönitz received reports of "impossible" encounters between U-boats and enemy vessels which made him suspect some compromise of his communications.

Admiral Raeder ordered Dönitz to disengage the Eisbär boats, which included Hartenstein's U-156, and send them to Cape Town as per the original plan.

After the war, Admiral Karl Dönitz said he believed air superiority was "not enough".

At the Nuremberg Trials held by the victorious Allies in 1946, Dönitz was indicted for war crimes with the issuance of the "Laconia order" as its centrepiece, a decision that backfired on the prosecution.

At the time, many – including Admiral Erich Raeder — felt such talk marked Dönitz as a weakling.

Battle returns to the mid-Atlantic (July 1942 – February 1943) With the U.S. finally arranging convoys, ship losses to the U-boats quickly dropped, Dönitz realized his U-boats were better used elsewhere.

Blair, Silent Victory Dönitz was deeply involved in the daily operations of his boats, often contacting them up to 70 times a day with questions such as their position, fuel supply. and other " minutiae ".

By November 1937, Dönitz became convinced that a major campaign against merchant shipping was practicable and began pressing for the conversion of the German fleet almost entirely to U-boats.

By the end of 1942, the production of Type VII U-boats had increased to the point where Dönitz was finally able to conduct mass attacks by groups of submarines, a tactic he called Rudel (group or pack) and became known as "wolfpack" in English.

Despite a storm which scattered the convoy, the merchantmen reached the protection of land-based air cover, causing Dönitz to call off the attack.

Despite these successes, the Italian intervention was not favourably regarded by Dönitz, who characterised Italians as "inadequately disciplined" and "unable to remain calm in the face of the enemy".

Dönitz calculated 300 of the latest Atlantic Boats (the Type VII ), would create enough havoc among Allied shipping that Britain would be knocked out of the war.

Dönitz had lost his three leading aces: Kretschmer, Prien, and Schepke.

Dönitz had the settings book changed anyway, blacking out Bletchley Park for a period.

Dönitz, Karl, Grossadmiral, Zehn Jahre und Zwanzig Tage, translated by R. H. Stevens as Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1959) He advocated a strategy of attacking only merchant ships, targets relatively safe to attack.

Dönitz now moved his wolf packs further west, in order to catch the convoys before the anti-submarine escort joined.

Dönitz pointed out that the order itself was a direct result of this callousness.