Foundationalism

According to foundationalism, a belief is epistemically justified only if it is justified by properly basic beliefs.

Classical foundationalism maintains that basic beliefs must be infallible if they are to justify nonbasic beliefs, and that only deductive reasoning can be used to transfer justification from one belief to another.

Current approaches Axiomatic assumptions Some thinkers seek to articulate axiomatic assumptions on which science may be based, a form of foundationalism.

Foundationalism and the other responses to the regress problem are essentially defenses against skepticism.

Foundationalism holds that there are 'basic beliefs' which serve as foundations to anchor the rest of our beliefs.

Foundationalism is the belief that a chain of justification begins with a belief that is justified, but which is not justified by another belief.

Foundationalism seeks to escape the regress argument by claiming that there are some beliefs for which it is improper to ask for a justification.

In terms of epistemology therefore, he can be said to have contributed such ideas as a rigorous conception of foundationalism and the possibility that reason is the only reliable method of attaining knowledge.

Lemos 2007, pp. 50-51 Laurence BonJour has argued that the classical formulation of foundationalism requires basic beliefs to be infallible, incorrigible, indubitable, and certain if they are to be adequately justified.

Modest foundationalism can also be used to avoid the problem of inference.

O'Brien 2006, p. 184 Internalism and externalism Foundationalism can take internalist and externalist forms.

Outline Foundationalism is an attempt to respond to the regress problem of justification in epistemology.

Postmodernists and post-structuralists such as Richard Rorty and Jacques Derrida have attacked foundationalism on the grounds that the truth of a statement or discourse is only verifiable in accordance with other statements and discourses.

Similarly, critics of externalist foundationalism argue that only mental states or properties the believer is aware of could make a belief justified.

This argument can be seen as directly related to Wittgenstein 's theory of language, drawing a parallel between postmodernism and late logical positivism that is united in critique of foundationalism.

This position is motivated in part by the desire to avoid what is seen as the arbitrariness and circularity of its chief competitors, foundationalism and coherentism.

This takes a modest approach to foundationalism – religious beliefs are not taken to be infallible, but are assumed to be prima facie justified unless evidence arises to the contrary.

This view can be seen as either a version of foundationalism, with common sense statements taking the role of basic statements, or as a version of Coherentism.