Hegel in a sentence

Critique of Hegel Schopenhauer expressed his dislike for the philosophy of his contemporary Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel many times in his published works.

For these scholars, fairly well represented by the Hegel Society of America and in cooperation with German scholars such as Otto Pöggeler and Walter Jaeschke, Hegel's works should be read without preconceptions.

Hegel G.W.F. Hegel in his Science of Logic (1812) attempted to provide a more comprehensive system of categories than Kant and developed a structure that was almost entirely triadic.

Hegel preserves this essential Platonic and Kantian concern in the form of infinity going beyond the finite (a process that Hegel in fact relates to "freedom" and the "ought" See Science of Logic, trans.

Overwhelmingly due to Alexandre Kojève 's influential lectures published as Introduction à la lecture de Hegel (Paris, 1947), selections translated into English by James Nichols as Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (New York, 1969).

Robert Pippin's Hegel's Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) emphasizes the continuity of Hegel's concerns with Kant's.

Robert Wallace, Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) explains how Hegel's Science of Logic defends Kant's idea of freedom as going beyond finite "inclinations", contra skeptics such as David Hume.

The difficulty in reading Hegel was perceived in Hegel's own day, and persists into the 21st century.

Under Hegel's concept of "subject-object identity," subject and object both have Spirit (Hegel's ersatz, redefined, nonsupernatural "God") as their conceptual (not metaphysical) inner reality—and in that sense are identical.

W. Kaufmann, 1966, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, p. 99 Voegelin argued that Hegel should be understood not as a philosopher, but as a "sorcerer" -- i.e., as a mystic and Hermetic thinker.

Hegel on the other hand may propose to us in our present-day that social democracy is providing us with solutions too quickly rather than too slowly as Marxists would say.

This sense of universality is perhaps best captured by Ato Sekyi-Otu’s notion of “partisan universalism,” building on Fanon, along with Marx, G. W. F. Hegel, and Aimé Césaire.

Hegel wants to demonstrate the fundamental misconceptions of the traditional epistemology as well as its contradictory nature.

Hegel said that change is inherent.

Lefebvre’s originality lay in how he united Hegel’s unhappy consciousness with young Marx’s humanist critique.

Yet, Lefebvre recognized how the idealist basis of Hegel’s ought to be grounded in concrete history.

But instead he should have analyzed its diverse ethnic groups’ struggle for recognition in terms of Plato’s thymos and Hegel’s desire for recognition.

It is staggering to see the author of the thesis that history ends in the dominance of liberalism seeking to derive support from Hegel, even as he appears in Kojève’s interpretation.

The philosopher Hegel saw this as the quintessence of true tragedy: not a conflict between good and evil, but between right and right.

As Alan explained, Marx started out as a follower of the great German philosopher, Hegel.