Platonist

Although Wittgenstein largely disregarded Aristotle (Ray Monk's biography suggests that he never read Aristotle at all) it seems that they shared some anti-Platonist views on the universal/particular issue regarding primary substances.

A Platonist might view particular formal systems as approximating an underlying reality.

As a boy, he studied philosophy for four years under the Platonist teacher Pamphilus.

As a Platonist Gödel was reticent in the presence of the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle.

For a Platonist, that is utter blasphemy – and all the worse because it obviously derives to some extent from the sharply other-worldly side of Plato's own teaching (e.g. in the Phaedo ).

From this criticism to psychologism, the distinction between psychological acts and their intentional objects, and the difference between the normative side of logic and the theoretical side, derives from a platonist conception of logic.

Gödel was a platonist and therefore had no problems with asserting the truth and falsehood of statements independent of their provability.

He developed his own tripartite soul following the examples of Plato; some scholars reference him as a Platonist.

However, gnosis itself refers to a very specialised form of knowledge, deriving both from the exact meaning of the original Greek term and its usage in Platonist philosophy.

Kleene formally defined intuitionistic truth from a realist position, yet Brouwer would likely reject this formalization as meaningless, given his rejection of the realist/Platonist position.

Kurt Gödel offered opinions referred to as Platonist (see various sources re Gödel).

Putnam strongly rejected the term " Platonist " as implying an over-specific ontology that was not necessary to mathematical practice in any real sense.

Subsequently, he adopted Platonism after encountering a Platonist thinker who had recently settled in his city.

The first recorded use of the term is found in the mid-second-century neo-Platonist work the Chaldean Oracles (Fragment 153 des Places (Paris, 1971): 'For the theourgoí do not fall under the fate-governed herd').

The Platonist answer is that all the green things are green in virtue of the existence of a universal; a single abstract thing that, in this case, is a part of all the green things.

The Platonist seemed to outweigh the Aristotelian in Alan, but he felt strongly that the divine is all intelligibility and argued this notion through much Aristotelian logic combined with Pythagorean mathematics.

The treatise as it stands in the Enneads is a most powerful protest on behalf of Hellenic philosophy against the un-Hellenic heresy (as it was from the Platonist as well as the orthodox Christian point of view) of Gnosticism.

This for a Platonist is utter blasphemy, and all the worse because it obviously derives to some extent from the sharply other-worldly side of Plato's own teaching (e.g. in the Phaedo ).

Though the details would be modified in light of his later work, Kepler never relinquished the Platonist polyhedral-spherist cosmology of Mysterium Cosmographicum.